As President Vladimir Putin’s violent invasion of Ukraine continues, pressure is growing for Moscow to be named a state supporter of terrorism, which would subject it to further penalties and add it to the small list of nations the United States considers to be pariahs. Although Russia’s heinous and aggressive behaviour in Ukraine warrants harsh censure, a state sponsor designation is the wrong weapon for the job at hand.
Joe Biden, the president, has resisted doing this. However, Congress is moving forward with legislation in the House and Senate that would officially label Russia, following the lead of senior leadership, including Speaker Nancy Pelosi. This wouldn’t help Kyiv’s position in resisting Russian aggression, and it would also hinder future peace efforts and have other unfavourable implications.
What would naming accomplish? It starts export controls, stops foreign aid, and restricts access to debt relief. It might initiate penalties that end up punishing organisations and people that conduct business with the sanctioned state. Additionally, it restricts a designated state’s claim to sovereign immunity, leaving it more open to legal action in American courts. The stigma it generates, however, is likely its most damaging effect. Because the United States uses state sponsorship to demonise nations, both American and non-American businesses frequently avoid working with designees, even when they are not legally obligated to.
It may seem like a just retribution for Russia’s onslaught on Ukraine to be designated as a state supporter of terrorism, but doing so would probably backfire for a number of reasons.
First, the state sponsor label is a blunt tool that shouldn’t be used with Russia, a nation that the United States still needs to cooperate with on the international scene. The nations that are already listed as state sponsors—Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Syria—should serve as a model for lawmakers. The United States has no diplomatic or business relations with any of these nations. Despite the tensions between the United States and Russia, it is not yet there and neither should it want to be. Even if they are becoming more strained, diplomatic ties between the United States and Russia still exist and are crucial for managing world crises. The United States and Russia have no choice but to cooperate at the U.N. Security Council and other multilateral venues to support the U.N.’s dozens of peace missions, cross-border aid to Syria, peace negotiations in conflicts like Libya and Yemen, and many other programmes. A designation might endanger even covert bilateral diplomacy, as the present discussions regarding the detention of WNBA player Brittney Griner and Paul Whelan (whose sister has vocally opposed the measure).
Second, politicians need to think about the effects of Russia’s conflict in Ukraine. Preserving room for the parties to sit down again and discuss a deal Kyiv can live with despite Russia’s recent escalatory moves must continue to be a major priority, especially given the still-uncertain odds that either side would achieve a decisive military victory. That will be harder with designation. Before agreeing to any future peace agreement, Russia will undoubtedly want this penalty reversed; however, a state supporter of terrorism label is notoriously difficult to remove. A future government would need to win over a Congress that was swayed by accumulating proof of Russian atrocities and related public opinion in order to lift it. Legally speaking, it would also need to demonstrate that Russia’s actions or leader have changed—both extremely improbable scenarios.
The designation would reduce Russia’s sovereign immunity in U.S. courts and make it vulnerable to lawsuits brought by American plaintiffs, so there is also a litigation angle. Cases against other state sponsors of terrorism have dragged on for years, increased the possibility of awards in the billions of dollars, and significantly hampered attempts to remove the label. Such legal disputes, in the case of Russia, could raise new obstacles in the way of any upcoming peace talks. If subsequent claims are successful, it might also lower the overall amount of money available for compensation for war crimes for Ukrainian victims.
Third, the legislation in Congress would unnecessarily muddle the definition of “terrorism.” The proposed legislation appears to define “terrorism” for the purposes of the designation statute to include alleged war crimes committed by Russian forces and state-sponsored operations. The United States has long endeavoured to separate hostilities carried out by state security agencies from terrorism, which is widely characterised as political violence committed by non-state actors, even if such hostilities violate the laws of war. By combining the two ideas, there is a danger of setting a precedent that unnecessarily expands a phrase that is already overused, leaving the United States and its allies open to future adversaries designating them in a same way.
Fourth, this action may make life much more difficult for the millions of civilians whose lives have been upended by the war, both those in Ukraine and those impacted by the global economic effects. As previously said, interactions with the listed state are extremely risky due to prior terrorist designations. If companies and relief organisations worry that supporting the supply of goods purchased from Russia would expose them to legal or reputational concerns, deals that reduce the humanitarian costs of the war, like the U.N.-backed grain deal, would be more difficult to negotiate. Given that Russia’s economy is significantly larger than any other country previously designated, it is difficult to predict the economic shockwaves that could result from designation. However, they may exacerbate the negative effects of the war on the world’s most vulnerable people, who are already experiencing commodity shocks and rising food insecurity, particularly in the Middle East, North, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
